On sustainability of a small coalition in a large collective team. Part 2

Vladimir Tsurikov; Elena M. Skarzhinskaya

ON SUSTAINABILITY OF A SMALL COALITION IN A LARGE COLLECTIVE TEAM. PART 2 On sustainability of a small coalition in a large collective team. Part 2

АА Аа

Published in Theoretical economics · Issue 5 · Pages 43–52 · Rubric: NEW INDUSTRIALIZATION: THEORETICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECT

Received: 08.04.2023 Accepted: 22.04.2023 Published: 02.05.2024

Authors

Vladimir Tsurikov

ORCID

Elena M. Skarzhinskaya

ORCID

Vladimir Tsurikov

Academic degree: doctor of economic sciences

Science rang: professor

Kostroma State Agricultural Academy Russian Federation · Kostroma

ORCID

Elena M. Skarzhinskaya

Kostroma State University Russian Federation · Kostroma

ORCID

ABSTRACT

Carrying out our study within the framework of mathematical modeling, incentives were analyzed which determine the real efforts of team members who are tasked with creating output (product) which has common value for the overall group and then divides and distributes the total income (dividend) received among members in equal shares. The supposition of the study was the forming of small groups of members (coalitions) within larger team structures which are united by a sense of mutual trust in one another and whose component members are not prone to displays of self-serving opportunistic behavior. Unlike non-coalition agents with the goal of maximizing their own individual dividends, the volumes attained by coalition member’s efforts correspond to a maximum dividend for the overall coalition. In our study it has been shown that the overall efforts of members of a coalition are much higher than the analogous efforts of non-coalition agents. Accordingly, under existing conditions where there is a distribution of the total income in equal shares, the overall dividend of a coalition member is in fact lower than the dividend of a non-coalition agent. Such conditions may be viewed by coalition members as unfair and in fact pose a real threat to the stability of the coalition. The necessary adjustment to the division of incentives and final dividends needed to eliminate such a threat are considered in this article and consist of a preliminary revision of the dividend distribution rules with adjustments in favor of coalition members. The boundaries and parameters of the values within the share of coalition members which correspond to the necessary conditions and adjustments needed to facilitate the stability of the coalition have been determined.

KEYWORDS

collective action; coalition, sustainability; Nash equilibrium; Pareto-preferable outcome; cooperative game.

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