student from 01.01.2021 until now
Ekaterinburg, Ekaterinburg, Russian Federation
student from 01.01.2021 until now
Ekaterinburg, Ekaterinburg, Russian Federation
VAC 5.2.5 Мировая экономика
Investigation of the influence of social pressure on donation decisions is an essential aspect for understanding the process of building an effective charity system. The purpose of the study is to examine the influence of cognitive distortions on donation decisions. The objectives of the study are to review the literature on the subject, conduct a laboratory experiment of the game Dictator in three variations (the Classic, Bully and Time-Delay versions) and interpret the results obtained with the potential to apply it. The method consists of conducting a laboratory experiment based on the three versions of the Dictator game using the z-Tree program. The sample consists of 18 students aged 19-20 years old, whose rewards were academic course points. Findings demonstrated an increase in endowments among participants with an exacerbation of the introduced cognitive distortions as the game progressed. For example, in the Classic version of the game, Dictators gave an unendowed Victim on average 7.6 tokens out of a possible 20 tokens, as the decision depended solely on the Dictator's willingness to donate. In the Bully version, the Dictator was given the option to change the size of the donation from the already initial fair distribution of the endowment to 10 out of 20 available tokens, causing the average donation to rise to 8.6 tokens. In the Time-Delay version, the Dictator had to explain the chosen allocation of endowment in text format to the Victim, which increased donations to an average of 10.9 tokens. The results of the study may find application in charity: more personal familiarity with the needy person may lead to an increase in the size and frequency of donations. The main limitation of the study is the small sample size, consisting only of students awarded with course points. Future studies should utilize random sampling of participants and monetary reward.
Dictator game, cognitive distortions, human generosity, behavioral economics, charity, z-Tree
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